1. p. 741
2. introducing "Intermediate-level Knowledge" by Lowgren
1. Jonas Löwgren. 2013. Annotated portfolios and other forms of intermediate-level knowledge.interactions 20, 1 (January 2013), 30-34.
2. Kristina Höök and Jonas Löwgren. 2012. Strong concepts: Intermediate-level knowledge in interaction design research. ACM Trans. Comput.-Hum. Interact. 19, 3, Article 23 (October 2012), 18 pages.
(pp. 23:11- 23:13)
4 constructs:
1. contextual grounding
2. horizontal grounding
3. vertical grounding
4. reflection, articulation, and abstraction
2019年12月3日 星期二
2019年11月11日 星期一
week 10. revisiting 3 paradigms in HCI
The Three Paradigms of HCI
1. p. 10
Paradigms compared:
Metaphor of interaction:
Central goal for interaction:
Typical questions of interest:
"The primary challenge, however for the 3rd paradigm to
fully bloom is to break out of the standards which have
been set up by incompatible paradigms."
人誌學法還是被誤解為"抽取使用者需求" 的方法, 而非分析整個 HCI 基地的學門.
Dourish, for example, argues that 20 years after the
introduction of ethnography into the HCI canon it is still
systematically misunderstood as a method for extracting
user requirements rather than a discipline that
analyzes the entire site of human-computer interaction.
Thus, an ethnography, by itself, does not constitute
a legitimate CHI publication without an additional
instrumental component such as user requirements or
an evaluation of the interface using information processing
criteria. (還是回到 2nd Paradigm 的標準)
3. p. 13
Objective vs. Subjective Knowledge
The 1st and 2nd paradigms emphasize the importance of objective knowledge. The 3rd paradigm, in contrast, sees knowledge as arising from situated viewpoints in the world and often sees the dominant focus on objective knowledge as suspect in riding roughshod (馬蹄鐵上裝有防滑釘的) over the complexities of multiple perspectives at the scene of action.
...
A number of HCI researchers have taken it a step further, recognizing the subjectivity of the researcher and the relationship between the researcher and the researched; where issues of intersubjectivity (互為主體性) are common in anthropology, they are remote and difficult to address in the 2nd paradigm.
Generalized vs. Situated Knowledge
The 2nd paradigm values generalized models such as
GOMS. But because the 3rd paradigm sees knowledge
as arising and becoming meaningful in specific situations,
it has a greater appreciation for detailed, rich
descriptions of specific situations.
....we all now recognize that “externalities” are often central
figures in the understanding of interaction.
Information vs. Interpretation
The 2nd paradigm arises out of a combination of computer
science and laboratory behavioral sciences that
emphasize analytic means such as statistical analysis,
classification and corroboration (確證) in making sense of what
is going on at the site of interaction, often under controlled
conditions.
...
The epistemological stance
brought to this site is generally hermeneutic, not analytic,
and focuses on developing wholistic, reflective
understanding while staying open to the possibility of
simultaneous, conflicting interpretation.
“Clean” vs. “Messy” Formalisms
The 2nd paradigm, reacting to the a-theoretical orientation
of the 1st paradigm, values clean, principled, well-defined
forms of knowledge.
The difference between
these ways of thinking is rooted in whether researchers
place the cleanliness and certitude (確實) of formal
models at the center of their thinking or whether they
instead place an appreciation for the complexity of real-world,
messy behavior and activity at the center.
4. p. 16
We are not arguing that the 3rd paradigm is right, while
the 1st and 2nd paradigms are wrong. Rather, we argue
that paradigms highlight different kinds of questions
that are interesting and methods for answering them.
...
(不同的 knowledge 就用不同的 paradigm)
it would probably be unwise to attempt to uncover the
rich appropriations of a situated technology with an
objective laboratory test.
5. p. 14
Epistemological distinctions between the paradigms
Appropriate disciplines for interaction
Kind of methods strived for
Legitimate kinds of knowledge
How you know something is true
Values
Questions:
How about new paradigms beyond 3 paradigms? (for example, speculative turn)
reference:
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1Hq-Yeuk-35AvWO7ts9d0BdjQlqjNklXI
NTU companion :
https://www.facebook.com/download/776236692828893/Remembering%20the%20past%20to%20imagine%20the%20future-%20the%20prospective%20brain.pdf?av=522911801&eav=AfZqWMKhRZx2sQyas3El_tL2M6OWxuQSZd7roGSIQAp8paKg88bwjnBf_ByAwPos8RY&hash=AcrSCmfiqETcTSf_
1. p. 10
Paradigms compared:
Metaphor of interaction:
- P1: Interaction as man-machine coupling
- P2: Interaction as information communication
- P3: Interaction as phenomenologically situated
Central goal for interaction:
- P1: Optimizing fit between man and machine
- P2: Optimizing accuracy and efficiency of information transfer
- P3: Support for situated action in the world
Typical questions of interest:
- P1: How can we fix specific problems that arise in interaction?
- P2: (1) What mismatches come up in communication between computers and people? (2) How can we accurately model what people do? (3) How can we improve the efficiency of computer use?
- P3: (1) What existing situated activities in the world should we support? (2) How do users appropriate technologies, and how can we support those appropriations? (3) How can we support interaction without constraining it too strongly by what a computer can do or understand? (4) What are the politics and values at the site of interaction, and how can we support those in design?
"The primary challenge, however for the 3rd paradigm to
fully bloom is to break out of the standards which have
been set up by incompatible paradigms."
人誌學法還是被誤解為"抽取使用者需求" 的方法, 而非分析整個 HCI 基地的學門.
Dourish, for example, argues that 20 years after the
introduction of ethnography into the HCI canon it is still
systematically misunderstood as a method for extracting
user requirements rather than a discipline that
analyzes the entire site of human-computer interaction.
Thus, an ethnography, by itself, does not constitute
a legitimate CHI publication without an additional
instrumental component such as user requirements or
an evaluation of the interface using information processing
criteria. (還是回到 2nd Paradigm 的標準)
3. p. 13
Objective vs. Subjective Knowledge
The 1st and 2nd paradigms emphasize the importance of objective knowledge. The 3rd paradigm, in contrast, sees knowledge as arising from situated viewpoints in the world and often sees the dominant focus on objective knowledge as suspect in riding roughshod (馬蹄鐵上裝有防滑釘的) over the complexities of multiple perspectives at the scene of action.
...
A number of HCI researchers have taken it a step further, recognizing the subjectivity of the researcher and the relationship between the researcher and the researched; where issues of intersubjectivity (互為主體性) are common in anthropology, they are remote and difficult to address in the 2nd paradigm.
Generalized vs. Situated Knowledge
The 2nd paradigm values generalized models such as
GOMS. But because the 3rd paradigm sees knowledge
as arising and becoming meaningful in specific situations,
it has a greater appreciation for detailed, rich
descriptions of specific situations.
....we all now recognize that “externalities” are often central
figures in the understanding of interaction.
Information vs. Interpretation
The 2nd paradigm arises out of a combination of computer
science and laboratory behavioral sciences that
emphasize analytic means such as statistical analysis,
classification and corroboration (確證) in making sense of what
is going on at the site of interaction, often under controlled
conditions.
...
The epistemological stance
brought to this site is generally hermeneutic, not analytic,
and focuses on developing wholistic, reflective
understanding while staying open to the possibility of
simultaneous, conflicting interpretation.
“Clean” vs. “Messy” Formalisms
The 2nd paradigm, reacting to the a-theoretical orientation
of the 1st paradigm, values clean, principled, well-defined
forms of knowledge.
The difference between
these ways of thinking is rooted in whether researchers
place the cleanliness and certitude (確實) of formal
models at the center of their thinking or whether they
instead place an appreciation for the complexity of real-world,
messy behavior and activity at the center.
4. p. 16
We are not arguing that the 3rd paradigm is right, while
the 1st and 2nd paradigms are wrong. Rather, we argue
that paradigms highlight different kinds of questions
that are interesting and methods for answering them.
...
(不同的 knowledge 就用不同的 paradigm)
it would probably be unwise to attempt to uncover the
rich appropriations of a situated technology with an
objective laboratory test.
5. p. 14
Epistemological distinctions between the paradigms
Appropriate disciplines for interaction
- P1: Engineering, programming, ergonomics
- P2: Laboratory and theoretical behavioral science
- P3: Ethnography, action research, practicebased research, interaction analysis
Kind of methods strived for
- P1: Cool hacks
- P2: Verified design and evaluation methods that can be applied regardless of context
- P3: A palette of situated design and evaluation strategies
Legitimate kinds of knowledge
- P1: Pragmatic, objective details
- P2: Objective statements with general applicability
- P3: Thick description, stakeholder “careabouts”
How you know something is true
- P1: You tried it out and it worked.
- P2: You refute the idea that the difference between experimental conditions is due to chance
- P3: You argue about the relationship between your data(s) and what you seek to understand.
Values
- P1: (1) reduce errors (2) ad hoc is OK (3) cool hacks desired
- P2: (1) optimization (2) generalizability wherever possible (3) principled evaluation is a priori better than ad hoc, since design can be structured to reflect paradigm (4) structured design better than unstructured (5) reduction of ambiguity (6) top-down view of knowledge
- P3: (1) Construction of meaning is intrinsic to interaction activity (2) what goes on around systems is more interesting than what’s happening at the interface (3) “zensign” – what you don’t build is as important as what you do build (4) goal is to grapple with (搏鬥) the full complexity around the system
Questions:
How about new paradigms beyond 3 paradigms? (for example, speculative turn)
reference:
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1Hq-Yeuk-35AvWO7ts9d0BdjQlqjNklXI
NTU companion :
https://www.facebook.com/download/776236692828893/Remembering%20the%20past%20to%20imagine%20the%20future-%20the%20prospective%20brain.pdf?av=522911801&eav=AfZqWMKhRZx2sQyas3El_tL2M6OWxuQSZd7roGSIQAp8paKg88bwjnBf_ByAwPos8RY&hash=AcrSCmfiqETcTSf_
2019年11月4日 星期一
week 9. perceptual crossing
student presentation
Perceptual crossing:
1. Designing for perceptual crossing to improve user involvement
2. Designing for Perceptual Crossing: Applying and Evaluating Design Notions
3. Designing for perceptual crossing: designing and comparing three behaviors
Extra experiment:
“It's So Touching”: Emotional Value in Distal Contact
知覺現象學 reference:
Exercise:
define 16 patterns of perceptual crossing between human and object
(how about extending time into past-present-future?)
Perceptual crossing:
1. Designing for perceptual crossing to improve user involvement
2. Designing for Perceptual Crossing: Applying and Evaluating Design Notions
3. Designing for perceptual crossing: designing and comparing three behaviors
Extra experiment:
“It's So Touching”: Emotional Value in Distal Contact
知覺現象學 reference:
Interaction design for and with the lived body: Some implications of merleau-ponty's phenomenology
Exercise:
define 16 patterns of perceptual crossing between human and object
(how about extending time into past-present-future?)
2019年10月21日 星期一
week 7. situated visualization
situated visualization
1. with sketch:
In speculative design, maybe with props (道具)
1. with sketch:
Sketching and Ideation Activities for Situated Visualization Design
2. with photo
3. with (mock-up) prototype
In speculative design, maybe with props (道具)
with booklet:
Bespoke Booklets: A Method for Situated Co-Speculation
Case study:
IoT speculation with "app LOGO" attached on home appliance
Discourse Analysis 練習
第六章，"關於對話"重點:
1. 將對話內容當作一種社會行動加以理解
2. 梅納德 (Maynard) 觀點-展示順序 (perspective-display sequence)
3. 注重談話旨在表現的行動，以及被選來表現該行動的工具
4. 詞彙選擇及分類
5. 結構組織 (言談的序列結構)
6. 對於說話者面向之一的觀察 (安排或引導方向)
7.由社會體制觀察拒絕與異議 (偏好，接受則明快，拒絕則遲疑)
Discourse Analysis 練習
第六章，"關於對話"重點:
1. 將對話內容當作一種社會行動加以理解
2. 梅納德 (Maynard) 觀點-展示順序 (perspective-display sequence)
3. 注重談話旨在表現的行動，以及被選來表現該行動的工具
4. 詞彙選擇及分類
5. 結構組織 (言談的序列結構)
6. 對於說話者面向之一的觀察 (安排或引導方向)
7.由社會體制觀察拒絕與異議 (偏好，接受則明快，拒絕則遲疑)
2019年10月14日 星期一
week 6. adding method to meaning
A. Light. 2006. Adding method to meaning: A technique for exploring peoples’ experience with digital products. Behaviour and Information Technology 25, 2, 175--187.
既然麥卡錫和萊特對經驗的觀點傾向於一種對話式的意義創造過程，這類的研究必然要扣緊這個概念來研究"經驗"自身，根據書中所提的六個主張，Ann Light 的論文 "為意義增添方法" (Adding method to meaning) [1]，詳細的描述了麥卡錫與萊特所定義的經驗一詞的特性與範疇，並且提出了具體的研究方法，以及實際的"經驗研究"個案。Light 提出了兩個步驟來研究經驗: (1) 外顯化資料收集 (explicitation data-gathering)， (2) 論述分析 (discourse analysis)。第一部分注重喚起 (evocation)參與者在經驗當下的種種感官與知覺事實，訪談的技巧側重在參與者的描述而刻意避免自我解釋；第二部分則更深入探究這些親身經驗 (felt experience)中的動機與解釋，訪談的方向從第一部分的"甚麼" (what)，轉向"為何"(why)、"如何"(how)。這時候，互動設計研究者的角色轉趨重要，必須隨時動態改變，以期達到麥卡錫與萊特所謂的"意義創造的自身對話性"(intrinsic dialogicality of meaning making)，研究者要細心聆聽，並適度參與對話，引發參與者的深度反思與對話。最後根據訪談所得到的說明 (accounts)，分析出質性的洞見 (insights) 與主題 (themes)。
Ann Light 提出的這套方法，雖然不是唯一並且完美的，但是，她示範了這類親身經驗 (felt experience)研究的一個可行的途徑。參與者並不是實驗室中的受測者 (subject)，研究者也不是身穿白色實驗袍的客觀他者，而更重要的是，設計研究者在實踐當中，不斷地朝向對話性(dialogicality)，引發意義創造 (meaning making)，研究的旨趣從客觀事實轉向 "理解" (understanding)，視域延伸 (horizontal fusion)，研究的過程也揭示了意義創造的過程。
雖然第二派典在認知心理學上研究了許多的 "經驗"，但是，人類還有許許多多的經驗是第二派典完全使不上力的，這類親身經驗不能用第二派典研究，並不表示這些經驗不重要，相反的，這些經驗往往更重要，更浩瀚: 不期而遇 (serendipity)、期待感 (anticipation)、 詩意 (poetic experience)、瀕死經驗(Near-Death Experience, NDE)、侘寂 (wabi-sabi)、預感能力 (pre-cognition)，禪定(Zen mediation)。新實證主義則大膽的假設的這些經驗發生時，人類的大腦必定發生相對應的改變，因此，費盡一切心思去測量腦波的改變，反射區的放電情況，然而，最終，親身經驗 (felt experience) 還是無法透過儀器來探知，同理，腦的訊號一樣時，也不保證能夠感受到相同的親身經驗。
論述分析 (Discourse Analysis) 的精神與方法
What is a proper method to interpret Cultural Probes? DA? Mixed Methods? (example: Designing to Support Social Connectedness: The Case of SnowGlobe)
Notice the use of Language
What are the codes (segments) and variations?
ex. codes: Object-Practice-Meaning Framework (only for example)
variations: self-presentation - others - emotional degree (only for example)
Reference:
1. http://interactionpodium.blogspot.com/2014/12/opa.html
2. https://www.books.com.tw/products/0010723484
http://www.weber.com.tw/document/pdf/SR07-007-01.pdf
既然麥卡錫和萊特對經驗的觀點傾向於一種對話式的意義創造過程，這類的研究必然要扣緊這個概念來研究"經驗"自身，根據書中所提的六個主張，Ann Light 的論文 "為意義增添方法" (Adding method to meaning) [1]，詳細的描述了麥卡錫與萊特所定義的經驗一詞的特性與範疇，並且提出了具體的研究方法，以及實際的"經驗研究"個案。Light 提出了兩個步驟來研究經驗: (1) 外顯化資料收集 (explicitation data-gathering)， (2) 論述分析 (discourse analysis)。第一部分注重喚起 (evocation)參與者在經驗當下的種種感官與知覺事實，訪談的技巧側重在參與者的描述而刻意避免自我解釋；第二部分則更深入探究這些親身經驗 (felt experience)中的動機與解釋，訪談的方向從第一部分的"甚麼" (what)，轉向"為何"(why)、"如何"(how)。這時候，互動設計研究者的角色轉趨重要，必須隨時動態改變，以期達到麥卡錫與萊特所謂的"意義創造的自身對話性"(intrinsic dialogicality of meaning making)，研究者要細心聆聽，並適度參與對話，引發參與者的深度反思與對話。最後根據訪談所得到的說明 (accounts)，分析出質性的洞見 (insights) 與主題 (themes)。
Ann Light 提出的這套方法，雖然不是唯一並且完美的，但是，她示範了這類親身經驗 (felt experience)研究的一個可行的途徑。參與者並不是實驗室中的受測者 (subject)，研究者也不是身穿白色實驗袍的客觀他者，而更重要的是，設計研究者在實踐當中，不斷地朝向對話性(dialogicality)，引發意義創造 (meaning making)，研究的旨趣從客觀事實轉向 "理解" (understanding)，視域延伸 (horizontal fusion)，研究的過程也揭示了意義創造的過程。
雖然第二派典在認知心理學上研究了許多的 "經驗"，但是，人類還有許許多多的經驗是第二派典完全使不上力的，這類親身經驗不能用第二派典研究，並不表示這些經驗不重要，相反的，這些經驗往往更重要，更浩瀚: 不期而遇 (serendipity)、期待感 (anticipation)、 詩意 (poetic experience)、瀕死經驗(Near-Death Experience, NDE)、侘寂 (wabi-sabi)、預感能力 (pre-cognition)，禪定(Zen mediation)。新實證主義則大膽的假設的這些經驗發生時，人類的大腦必定發生相對應的改變，因此，費盡一切心思去測量腦波的改變，反射區的放電情況，然而，最終，親身經驗 (felt experience) 還是無法透過儀器來探知，同理，腦的訊號一樣時，也不保證能夠感受到相同的親身經驗。
論述分析 (Discourse Analysis) 的精神與方法
What is a proper method to interpret Cultural Probes? DA? Mixed Methods? (example: Designing to Support Social Connectedness: The Case of SnowGlobe)
Notice the use of Language
What are the codes (segments) and variations?
ex. codes: Object-Practice-Meaning Framework (only for example)
variations: self-presentation - others - emotional degree (only for example)
Reference:
1. http://interactionpodium.blogspot.com/2014/12/opa.html
2. https://www.books.com.tw/products/0010723484
http://www.weber.com.tw/document/pdf/SR07-007-01.pdf
2019年9月30日 星期一
week 4. Technology as Experience
John McCarthy and Peter Wright. 2004. Technology as experience. Interactions 11, 5 (September 2004), 42-43. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1145/1015530.1015549
Featured:
Chapter 1 Living with Technology:
The User as a Cog in a Virtual Machine (During the 1970s and the 1980s the dominant approach to understanding relationships between people and technology assumed a single user sitting in front of a computer screen and keyboard performing a fairly well prescribed
task.)
The User as a Social Actor (During the late 1980s and the 1990s the opportunistic or contingent aspects of everyday activity became the central focus of challenges to the dominance
of information-processing psychology.)
Consumers and the User Experience (The 1990s saw the development of the dotcom companies and a multimillion-dollar games industry; strong penetration of computers into the
home; the confluence of computer and communications technologies; and the beginnings of wireless, mobile, and ubiquitous computing.)
Toward a Deeper Understanding of Technology as Experience: 6 propositions
從"技術即經驗"談起
摘錄此書提出的六大主張如後。
主張一:
主張二:
主張三:
主張四:
主張五:
主張一:
我們的第一個主張是，為了公平對待技術在我們生活中所造成的種種廣泛的影響，我們應該從親身感受的生命，以及行動與互動的親身感受或情感的品質兩方面，嘗試去詮釋人與技術的關係。
Our first proposition is that, in order to do justice to the wide range of influences that technology has in our lives, we should try to interpret the relationship between people and technology in terms of the felt life and the felt or emotional quality of action and interaction. (p. 12)
主張二:
我們的第二個主張是，互動技術在工作、居家、教育和休閒中的社會實踐描述，並不足以說明經驗描述中的"親身感受的生命"
Our second proposition is that social-practice accounts of interactive technologies at work, at home, in education, and in leisure understate the felt life in their accounts of experiences. (p. 14)
主張三:
我們的第三個主張是，用技術來描述親身感受的經驗，是困難的。
Our third proposition is that it is difficult to develop an account of felt experience with technology. (p. 15)
主張四:
我們的第四個主張是，就經驗而言，經驗的實用主義哲學特別的清晰，它們所包含的行動和意義創造的模式，說明了行動與互動中，某些關於親身感受的生命及情感的、感官的特質。
Our fourth proposition is that pragmatist philosophy of experience is particularly clarifying with respect to experience, and that the models of action and meaning making they encompass express something of felt life and the emotional and sensual character of action and interaction. (p. 17)
主張五:
我們的第五個主張是，實用主義所重視的情感的、自發的、創意的經驗面向，更強調了從理解技術的親身生活經驗中所創造的美學。
Our fifth proposition is that the importance given to the emotional-volitional and creative aspects of experience in pragmatism prioritizes the aesthetic in understanding our lived experience of technology. (p. 18)主張六:
我們的第六個主張也是最後一個主張， 建立實用主義的修訂理論，特別有益於理解技術與設計。
Our sixth and final proposition is that the revisionary theorizing of pragmatism is particularly valuable for understanding technology and design. (p. 19)
Feature Chapter 3 A Pragmatist Approach to Technology as Experience:
Background to Pragmatism and Experience
John Dewey(1859–1952)
Enriching Activity through Aesthetic Experience
Dialogicality
Bakhtin
Background to Pragmatism and Experience
John Dewey(1859–1952)
Enriching Activity through Aesthetic Experience
Dialogicality
Bakhtin
Ref:
2019年9月17日 星期二
week 3. embodied interaction: where the action is
https://www.dourish.com/embodied/embodied99.pdf
(https://drive.google.com/open?id=1AKW-FV_1aK8ZdeikVUXIaZD2CE0UNYTG)
http://www.billverplank.com/IxDSketchBook.pdf
Embodiement
1. Embodiment is the property of being manifest in and of the everyday world. Embodiment constitutes the transition from the realm of ideas to the realm of everyday
experience. (p. 8)
2. Embodiment, then, denotes not physical reality but participative status. When I talk of “embodied interaction”, I mean that interaction is an embodied phenomenon. It happens in the world, and that world (a physical world and a social world) lends form, substance and meaning to the interaction. (p. 8)
3. It (tangible computing) also tries to make computation manifest to us in the world in the same way as we encounter other phenomena, both as a way of making computation fit more naturally with the everyday world and as a way of enriching our experiences with the physical. (p. 8)
5.1 The Phenomenological Backdrop
1. Husserl argued that everyday experience is of concrete phenomena, and it is from such experience and phenomena that our conception of number and of mathematics exists. Phenomenology, then, was based in the phenomena of human experience, in contrast to the abstract entities at the heart of scientific and mathematical
practice. (p. 9)
2. For Heidegger, everyday experience happened not in the head, but out in the world.
Heidegger’s “hermeneutic phenomenology” rejected the detached, mentalistic intentionality of Husserl’s “transcendental” form. (p. 9)
3. Where Husserl had conceived of a progression from perception to
meaning to action, Heidegger stressed how we ordinarily act in a world that is already organised in terms of meaning and purpose. Heidegger took “shoot first, ask questions later” not as an imperative, but as a description of our mode of being. (p. 10)
4. Heidegger’s distinction between “ready-to-hand” and “present-at-hand.”
Heidegger argued that the ontological structure of the world is not a given, but arises through interaction....The critical thing to observe here is that this can happen only through involved, embodied action. Winograd and Flores use this to illustrate
that activity is constitutive of ontology, not independent of it. (p. 10)
5. ...the concept of “embodiment” features perhaps most strongly in the phenomenology of perception developed by Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962). Merleau-Ponty saw perception as an active process, and one carried out by an embodied subject. The embodied nature of action (and actors) was central to Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. (p. 10)
6. Foundations
1. What does phenomenology have to tell us about interaction? For the purposes at hand, I take three main points from this work: that interaction is physically and socially embodied; that ontology arises out of activity; and that meaning subsists in embodied action. (p. 12)
2. The relationship between action and meaning is, in many ways, the crucial one here...., the two pillars supporting a foundational model of interaction are intentionality and coupling. (p. 12)
3. Intentionality, loosely, is “about-ness.” It describes a referential relationship between two entities. Words, images and ideas are intentional phenomena; they are about things, in a way in which rocks, carpets and trees are not. Intentionality is the essence of how entities bear meaning. Coupling refers to the degree of coordination of two elements, and to how that coordination is maintained. (p. 12)
4. ...the meanings assigned to the objects in the interface depend on the coupling
of actions. Coupling and intentionality are directly related. By implication, then, in order to manage meaning, we must be able to manage coupling.(p. 12)
5. Coupling, then, is at the heart of our ability to work with artifacts and control them. Intentionality is an everyday phenomenon; arguably, it is the phenomenon of human experience, which works its way out in the interactions in which we engage with the world and with each other. It is rooted in our socialisation and our lives as social animals in a web of social and cultural relations which give meaning to everyday action. Fluid coupling provides us with the means to negotiate this web.
Embodiment lies in the relationship between the two. (p. 12)
6. What tangible computing does, by moving computation out into the world, is to open up new ways for us to be coupled to the intentional phenomena of computation.
In particular, it provides new ways for us to explore them. What turns out to be important about tangible computing, then, is not the physical nature of the objects through which we interact, but with what they represent and how we use them.
At the same time, social computing emphasises how context lends meaning, and places a primary emphasis on action rather than abstract representation.
Embodied interaction provides us with a perspective on computational representation that takes action as a primary constituent.
7. Conclusions
Embodied interaction, then, suggests that the future of interaction lies not in the interface “disappearing”, but rather in the interface becoming even more visible, or rather, available for a wider range of engagements and interactions. The question is, what form will that heightened visibility take? (p. 14)
Short report (within 300 words):
Describe the above embodied interaction with a phenomenological approach.
(note: describe it in terms of intentionality, coupling, meaning, everyday experience, human experience, social computing, embodied action, everyday world, phenomena, felt experience, encountering, rich experience, embodied perception...)
Deadline: Oct, 1st, 2019
upload to "10月1日體現互動摘要" on google drive
References:
(https://drive.google.com/open?id=1AKW-FV_1aK8ZdeikVUXIaZD2CE0UNYTG)
http://www.billverplank.com/IxDSketchBook.pdf
Embodiement
1. Embodiment is the property of being manifest in and of the everyday world. Embodiment constitutes the transition from the realm of ideas to the realm of everyday
experience. (p. 8)
2. Embodiment, then, denotes not physical reality but participative status. When I talk of “embodied interaction”, I mean that interaction is an embodied phenomenon. It happens in the world, and that world (a physical world and a social world) lends form, substance and meaning to the interaction. (p. 8)
3. It (tangible computing) also tries to make computation manifest to us in the world in the same way as we encounter other phenomena, both as a way of making computation fit more naturally with the everyday world and as a way of enriching our experiences with the physical. (p. 8)
5.1 The Phenomenological Backdrop
1. Husserl argued that everyday experience is of concrete phenomena, and it is from such experience and phenomena that our conception of number and of mathematics exists. Phenomenology, then, was based in the phenomena of human experience, in contrast to the abstract entities at the heart of scientific and mathematical
practice. (p. 9)
2. For Heidegger, everyday experience happened not in the head, but out in the world.
Heidegger’s “hermeneutic phenomenology” rejected the detached, mentalistic intentionality of Husserl’s “transcendental” form. (p. 9)
3. Where Husserl had conceived of a progression from perception to
meaning to action, Heidegger stressed how we ordinarily act in a world that is already organised in terms of meaning and purpose. Heidegger took “shoot first, ask questions later” not as an imperative, but as a description of our mode of being. (p. 10)
4. Heidegger’s distinction between “ready-to-hand” and “present-at-hand.”
Heidegger argued that the ontological structure of the world is not a given, but arises through interaction....The critical thing to observe here is that this can happen only through involved, embodied action. Winograd and Flores use this to illustrate
that activity is constitutive of ontology, not independent of it. (p. 10)
5. ...the concept of “embodiment” features perhaps most strongly in the phenomenology of perception developed by Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962). Merleau-Ponty saw perception as an active process, and one carried out by an embodied subject. The embodied nature of action (and actors) was central to Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. (p. 10)
6. Foundations
1. What does phenomenology have to tell us about interaction? For the purposes at hand, I take three main points from this work: that interaction is physically and socially embodied; that ontology arises out of activity; and that meaning subsists in embodied action. (p. 12)
2. The relationship between action and meaning is, in many ways, the crucial one here...., the two pillars supporting a foundational model of interaction are intentionality and coupling. (p. 12)
3. Intentionality, loosely, is “about-ness.” It describes a referential relationship between two entities. Words, images and ideas are intentional phenomena; they are about things, in a way in which rocks, carpets and trees are not. Intentionality is the essence of how entities bear meaning. Coupling refers to the degree of coordination of two elements, and to how that coordination is maintained. (p. 12)
4. ...the meanings assigned to the objects in the interface depend on the coupling
of actions. Coupling and intentionality are directly related. By implication, then, in order to manage meaning, we must be able to manage coupling.(p. 12)
5. Coupling, then, is at the heart of our ability to work with artifacts and control them. Intentionality is an everyday phenomenon; arguably, it is the phenomenon of human experience, which works its way out in the interactions in which we engage with the world and with each other. It is rooted in our socialisation and our lives as social animals in a web of social and cultural relations which give meaning to everyday action. Fluid coupling provides us with the means to negotiate this web.
Embodiment lies in the relationship between the two. (p. 12)
6. What tangible computing does, by moving computation out into the world, is to open up new ways for us to be coupled to the intentional phenomena of computation.
In particular, it provides new ways for us to explore them. What turns out to be important about tangible computing, then, is not the physical nature of the objects through which we interact, but with what they represent and how we use them.
At the same time, social computing emphasises how context lends meaning, and places a primary emphasis on action rather than abstract representation.
Embodied interaction provides us with a perspective on computational representation that takes action as a primary constituent.
7. Conclusions
Embodied interaction, then, suggests that the future of interaction lies not in the interface “disappearing”, but rather in the interface becoming even more visible, or rather, available for a wider range of engagements and interactions. The question is, what form will that heightened visibility take? (p. 14)
Short report (within 300 words):
Describe the above embodied interaction with a phenomenological approach.
(note: describe it in terms of intentionality, coupling, meaning, everyday experience, human experience, social computing, embodied action, everyday world, phenomena, felt experience, encountering, rich experience, embodied perception...)
Deadline: Oct, 1st, 2019
upload to "10月1日體現互動摘要" on google drive
References:
舒茲，社會世界的現象學
Where the action is slides2019年9月10日 星期二
week 1. 課程與回憶設計簡介
心理學家伊莉莎白．羅芙托斯研究記憶，更準確地說，她研究錯誤的記憶：人們記得的是不曾發生過的事，或是和事實不符的事。心理學家伊莉莎白．羅芙托斯研究記憶，更準確地說，她研究錯誤的記憶：人們記得的是不曾發生過的事，或是和事實不符的事。
參考書單:
記憶如何對你說謊：為何我們對兒時記憶、不存在的兇手、重大日子的細節總是信以為真？
Reference papers:
1. Chen, H.-C., Lin, Y.-C., & Liang, R.-H. (2013). Study through designing reminiscing activities for the elderly. Digital Creativity, Vol.24, No. 4, p.p. 327-341.
2. Bowen Kong, Wenn-Chieh Tsai, and Rung-Huei Liang. 2019. Confabulation Radio: Reflexive Speculation in Counterfactual Soundscape. In Extended Abstracts of the 2019 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI EA ’19). ACM, New York, NY, USA, Paper LBW0141
3. Wenn-Chieh Tsai, Po-Hao Wang, Hung-Chi Lee, Rung-Huei Liang, and Jane Hsu. 2014. The reflexive printer: toward making sense of perceived drawbacks in technology-mediated reminiscence. In Proceedings of the 2014 conference on Designing interactive systems (DIS ’14). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 995-1004.
4. Wenn-Chieh Tsai, Daniel Orth, and Elise van den Hoven. 2017. Designing Memory Probes to Inform Dialogue. In Proceedings of the 2017 Conference on Designing Interactive Systems (DIS '17). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 889-901.
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