1. Embodiment is the property of being manifest in and of the everyday world. Embodiment constitutes the transition from the realm of ideas to the realm of everyday
experience. (p. 8)
2. Embodiment, then, denotes not physical reality but participative status. When I talk of “embodied interaction”, I mean that interaction is an embodied phenomenon. It happens in the world, and that world (a physical world and a social world) lends form, substance and meaning to the interaction. (p. 8)
3. It (tangible computing) also tries to make computation manifest to us in the world in the same way as we encounter other phenomena, both as a way of making computation fit more naturally with the everyday world and as a way of enriching our experiences with the physical. (p. 8)
5.1 The Phenomenological Backdrop
1. Husserl argued that everyday experience is of concrete phenomena, and it is from such experience and phenomena that our conception of number and of mathematics exists. Phenomenology, then, was based in the phenomena of human experience, in contrast to the abstract entities at the heart of scientific and mathematical
practice. (p. 9)
2. For Heidegger, everyday experience happened not in the head, but out in the world.
Heidegger’s “hermeneutic phenomenology” rejected the detached, mentalistic intentionality of Husserl’s “transcendental” form. (p. 9)
3. Where Husserl had conceived of a progression from perception to
meaning to action, Heidegger stressed how we ordinarily act in a world that is already organised in terms of meaning and purpose. Heidegger took “shoot first, ask questions later” not as an imperative, but as a description of our mode of being. (p. 10)
4. Heidegger’s distinction between “ready-to-hand” and “present-at-hand.”
Heidegger argued that the ontological structure of the world is not a given, but arises through interaction....The critical thing to observe here is that this can happen only through involved, embodied action. Winograd and Flores use this to illustrate
that activity is constitutive of ontology, not independent of it. (p. 10)
5. ...the concept of “embodiment” features perhaps most strongly in the phenomenology of perception developed by Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962). Merleau-Ponty saw perception as an active process, and one carried out by an embodied subject. The embodied nature of action (and actors) was central to Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. (p. 10)
1. What does phenomenology have to tell us about interaction? For the purposes at hand, I take three main points from this work: that interaction is physically and socially embodied; that ontology arises out of activity; and that meaning subsists in embodied action. (p. 12)
2. The relationship between action and meaning is, in many ways, the crucial one here...., the two pillars supporting a foundational model of interaction are intentionality and coupling. (p. 12)
3. Intentionality, loosely, is “about-ness.” It describes a referential relationship between two entities. Words, images and ideas are intentional phenomena; they are about things, in a way in which rocks, carpets and trees are not. Intentionality is the essence of how entities bear meaning. Coupling refers to the degree of coordination of two elements, and to how that coordination is maintained. (p. 12)
4. ...the meanings assigned to the objects in the interface depend on the coupling
of actions. Coupling and intentionality are directly related. By implication, then, in order to manage meaning, we must be able to manage coupling.(p. 12)
5. Coupling, then, is at the heart of our ability to work with artifacts and control them. Intentionality is an everyday phenomenon; arguably, it is the phenomenon of human experience, which works its way out in the interactions in which we engage with the world and with each other. It is rooted in our socialisation and our lives as social animals in a web of social and cultural relations which give meaning to everyday action. Fluid coupling provides us with the means to negotiate this web.
Embodiment lies in the relationship between the two. (p. 12)
6. What tangible computing does, by moving computation out into the world, is to open up new ways for us to be coupled to the intentional phenomena of computation.
In particular, it provides new ways for us to explore them. What turns out to be important about tangible computing, then, is not the physical nature of the objects through which we interact, but with what they represent and how we use them.
At the same time, social computing emphasises how context lends meaning, and places a primary emphasis on action rather than abstract representation.
Embodied interaction provides us with a perspective on computational representation that takes action as a primary constituent.
Embodied interaction, then, suggests that the future of interaction lies not in the interface “disappearing”, but rather in the interface becoming even more visible, or rather, available for a wider range of engagements and interactions. The question is, what form will that heightened visibility take? (p. 14)
Short report (within 300 words):
Describe the above embodied interaction with a phenomenological approach.
(note: you might identify possible terms first, for example, intention, coupling, meaning, everyday experience, human experience, social computing, embodied action, everyday world, phenomena, felt experience, encountering, rich experience, embodied perception...)